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Abstract: We investigated whether anxious individuals, who adopt an inherently negative mindset,
demonstrate a particularly salient memory bias for words tainted by negative contexts. To this end,
sequentially presented target words, overlayed onto negative or neutral pictures, were studied in
separate blocks (within-subjects) using a deep or shallow encoding instruction (between-subjects).
Following study, in Test 1, participants completed separate recognition test blocks for the words
overlayed onto the negative and the neutral contexts. Following this, in Test 2, participants completed
a recognition test for the foils from each Test 1 block. We found a significant three-way interaction on
Test 2, such that individuals with high anxiety who initially studied target words using a shallow
encoding instruction, demonstrated significantly elevated memory for foils that were contained
within the negative Test 1 block. Results show that during retrieval (Test 1), participants re-entered
the mode of processing (negative or neutral) engaged at encoding, tainting the encoding of foils with
that same mode of processing. The findings suggest that individuals with high relative to low anxiety,
adopt a particularly salient negative retrieval mode, and this creates a downstream bias in encoding
and subsequent retrieval of otherwise neutral information.
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1. Introduction
When trying to retrieve information about our past, it has been suggested that we do so
by constraining our “memory search” to the mode of processing we had engaged during initial
encoding [1]. Behavioural data from the memory-for-foils paradigm [1] supports the idea that
a re-initiation of encoding-related processing occurs during a recognition test [2]. That is, if we focused
on the meaning of a word during encoding, we think about word meanings again when we later search
our memory to determine whether it was part of a previously studied list. Conversely, if we focused
on the perceptual characteristics of the word (e.g., font colour) then subsequent memory searches will
target perceptual aspects. A by-product of such a search strategy is that new information (such as foils,
or distractors) that is present on that recognition test, inadvertently becomes encoded, and tainted with
the same mode of processing, reaping the memory benefits (or costs) associated with that re-activated
processing mode. In this study, we examined whether, during the process of remembering information
learned within an emotionally negative relative to neutral context, task-irrelevant information gets
encoded with that same emotional valence, resulting in its enhanced later memorability. The second
aim of our study was to determine if the downstream memory bias, if any, would be more profound
in those with high levels of generalised anxiety, as they have difficulty disengaging attention from
negative information and mindsets [3–5].
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1.1. Source-Constrained Retrieval and the Memory-for-Foils Effect
According to the transfer-appropriate processing principle [6], memory retrieval will be best when
the processes invoked during retrieval match those undergone during encoding, consistent with these two
processes being intimately linked and interdependent. In line with this, in the proceduralist perspective
proposed by Kolers [7,8]—for review, see [9]—encoding and retrieval are seen as overlapping; as such,
it becomes difficult, and potentially meaningless, to identify discrete encoding and retrieval phases.
One of the most compelling lines of research demonstrating a link between encoding and retrieval
processes is that using the memory-for-foils paradigm developed by Jacoby and colleagues [1,10,11].
They proposed that when remembering previously encoded information, the mode of processing engaged
during initial encoding is brought back online. In their research, they introduced a “memory-for-foils”
paradigm in which participants initially studied separate lists of words either under a deep (pleasantness
judgment) or shallow (vowel judgment) level of processing. Following study, two recognition tests were
administered (Test 1), and participants were told that each corresponded to either the deeply or the
shallowly studied target words, intermixed among unique sets of foil (lure) words. Finally, in a third
phase, participants were given a surprise recognition test assessing memory for the foil words (Test 2).
The critical finding from this paradigm was that participants displayed better recognition for foil
words that were derived from the recognition test of deep target words than of shallow target words.
To account for this effect, Jacoby and colleagues proposed that during retrieval (on Test 1)
participants re-entered the original encoding mode (i.e., either deep encoding or shallow encoding)
throughout that recognition test, so as to constrain their memory search. By re-engaging the encoding
mode, at the time of retrieval, the same processing was applied to all words (both the old target
words and the foils) on that recognition test. The end result was a benefit to memory on the
subsequent recognition test (Test 2) for the foils initially contained within the “deep” recognition
test, as compared to the “shallow” test. The benefit of deep processing had been conferred onto the foil
words, thus producing a memory advantage for these foils.
If such a “source-constrained retrieval” is indeed occurring, then the “memory-for-foils” effect
should be apparent following any number of different encoding manipulations (not just a level of
processing one), as long as those modes of processing can be reinstated at the time of retrieval.
There have been a number of corroborating studies since 2005, confirming and extending the
memory-for-foils paradigm [12–15] and providing evidence consistent with the reinstatement of
encoding processes at the time of retrieval. Importantly, Danckert, MacLeod, and Fernandes [2] showed
that another encoding manipulation—other than the standard levels-of-processing manipulation—also
produced the memory-for-foils pattern. In their study, imaging the referents of the words during
encoding, as opposed to imaging the words transformed from lower to upper case, led to better
memory for the foils (on Test 2) that came from the deep than shallow recognition test (i.e., from Test 1).
1.2. Recapitulation and the Reactivation of Neural Representations of Emotional Information
In related work, initial cognitive processes or neural regions initially active at encoding have been
shown to become re-engaged when tested at retrieval, in a process known as recapitulation [16,17].
In a recent study, Vogelsang, Bonnici, Bergstrom, Ranganath, and Simons [18] demonstrated the process
of recapitulation using the memory-for-foils paradigm, during which they were in an fMRI scanner.
Behavioural results replicated those of previous works. Interestingly, fMRI analysis also revealed
that the left inferior frontal gyrus (a region active during a “deep encoding” instruction at encoding
and not during a “shallow encoding” instruction) was active for foils that had been presented within
a recognition test for deeply-encoded targets. Considering that this area was active during retrieval
for deeply encoded words, but not for shallowly encoded words, suggests that constraining retrieval
for a particular processing type does indeed reactivate that particular (deep) mode of processing.
If the memory-for-foils paradigm can be used to induce recapitulation for words processed using
a deep encoding instruction, this paradigm should also induce recapitulation for words encoded with
an emotional mode of processing.
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One aim of the current study was to determine whether negative visual contexts experienced
during an encoding phase for targets could later produce enhanced memory for “foils” present during
an initial test for that target information. Numerous studies have demonstrated a memory advantage
for content that is of negative emotional valence, whether that content came in the form of pictures,
statements, or words [19–25]. Given this, we reasoned that in the process of remembering information
learned within a negative context, task-irrelevant information (the foils from the recognition test)
would also be encoded and tagged with that same negative valence; the end result would be
enhanced later memorability for these foils relative to foils encountered from a recognition test
for neutral-context targets.
In support of our reasoning, Bowen and Kensinger [26] have found evidence suggesting a neural
explanation for the associated memory advantage. They investigated the influence of emotional
valence on recapitulation by pairing neutral words with either negative, positive, or neutral faces or
scenes. Participants then completed a recognition test (remember-know-new paradigm) for the words
presented alone. Both encoding and retrieval were completed in an fMRI scanner. Results revealed
greater overlap in neural regions for words that had been studied in a negative context, as compared
to positive and neutral contexts, suggesting the negative mode of processing had been reactivated.
The goal of our study was to determine if this reactivated emotional mode of processing would taint
incidental information present at time of retrieval.
1.3. Individual Differences in Anxiety and Memory Bias
The second aim of our study was to determine if the downstream memory bias, if any, would be
more profound in those with high levels of anxiety. Among high trait anxiety groups, it has
been suggested that negative, threat-relevant stimuli recruit significant attentional resources [27–29],
and such groups are often characterized by intrusive or pervasive thoughts directed toward the source
of anxiety [30]. Moreover, anxious individuals have demonstrated a tendency to attend to [31,32]
and difficulty disengaging attention from [3–5] negative information. Research on mood-congruent
memory [33] suggests that information is better remembered if one’s current mood matches the valence
of the to-be-remembered information. As such, individuals plagued by an inherently negative mindset,
such as highly anxious individuals, may have better memory for negative information. Consequently,
this negative mindset and directed attention toward negative stimuli may influence the perception of
incidental, otherwise neutral, stimuli in the current environment. In turn, negatively-tainted neutral
information, such as foil words, may be easier for individuals with high, compared to low, anxiety
to remember. In the current study, we adapted Jacoby’s memory for foils paradigm to (1) extend
the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis to contrast effects derived from a negative versus neutral
encoding context; and (2) to determine whether there are individual differences in the degree to
which a negative or neutral context can influence subsequent memory for foils. To investigate the
latter, we compared performance in individuals classified with high versus low levels of trait anxiety.
Such a finding would extend those of other work [18,34] by suggesting that neutral information
can become associated with, or tainted by, a negative context by virtue of invoking a constrained
search of memory. As a consequence, the negatively-tainted information will be more memorable
compared to information associated with a neutral context [19–21,23–25]. Following from previous
work conducted by Jacoby and colleagues [1,10,11], we also instructed half of the participant group to
study words using a deep encoding instruction and the other to study words using a shallow encoding
instruction. As a result, our study consisted of two between groups variables, (1) trait anxiety groups;
and (2) encoding instruction groups.
Based on past research, we anticipate a memory advantage on Test 1, for words studied in
a negative context. Additionally, as a result of being associated with the negative information,
a memory advantage may be conferred on the foil words within the negative Test 1 subtest block.
As a consequence, recognition performance for the negative foil words, assessed on Test 2, will be
higher than for foils derived from the neutral Test 1 subtest.
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2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Participants
Eighty undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo (64 females) completed the
experiment for partial course credit. Forty participants were randomly assigned to a deep encoding
instruction group (mean age = 19.98 years, SD = 2.03, range = 16–26) and 40 were randomly assigned
to a shallow encoding group (mean age = 20.18 years, SD = 4.50, range = 17–46). Participants were
recruited in accordance with ethical guidelines governing the use of humans in research.
All participants completed the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) [35]. The scales contains
42 items, 14 of which are dedicated to measuring each separate construct. An individual item consists
of a statement that participants are instructed to provide a rating indicating how much the statement
relates to them over the past week. Ratings are made on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 to 3, where 0
represents no relation to the statement, and 3 indicates that the statement relates to them a lot.
Participants were also divided into two separate groups based on a median of the anxiety
ratings for the sample. The median score for anxiety was 7.5 (SD = 8.27). Median scores for
depression and stress were 4 (SD = 9.18) and 11.5 (SD = 8.99), respectively. Our “high anxiety”
group consisted of participants with mean anxiety scores higher than 7.5 (deep encoding group N = 20,
mean anxiety = 15.90, SD = 7.5; shallow encoding group N = 20, mean anxiety = 14.65, SD = 8.05),
and the remainder were categorized into the “low anxiety” group (deep encoding group N = 20,
mean anxiety = 3.20, SD = 2.09; shallow encoding group N = 20, mean anxiety = 3.35, SD = 2.49).
Note that independent sample t-tests revealed no significant difference between the high anxiety
(t(38) = 0.51, p = 0.62) groups who studied words under either a deep or shallow encoding instruction,
nor was there a difference between the low anxiety (t(38) = 0.21, p = 0.84) groups.
We conducted independent sample t-tests to determine whether the high and low anxiety groups
differed on depression or stress as reported on the DASS. There was a significant difference in mean
depression (t(78) = 5.31, p < 0.001), whereby the high anxiety group (M = 12.83, SD = 10.26) reported
a higher depression level than the low anxiety group (M = 3.43, SD = 4.44). Similarly, there was
a significant difference in trait stress levels (t(78) = 5.51, p < 0.001), whereby the high anxiety group
(M = 17.73, SD = 8.84) reported a higher level of stress than the low anxiety group (M = 8.28, SD = 6.30).
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Photos Used as Visual Context
Pictures used as background visual context were taken from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS) [36]. The IAPS is a database of pictures with normative ratings for valence, arousal,
and dominance based on a 9-point Likert scale. Two sets of pictures were created for the study. One set
consisted of 36 pictures that were negative in valence (M = 2.51, SD = 0.46) and the other set consisted
of 36 pictures that were neutral in valence (M = 5.06, SD = 0.56). Normative arousal ratings were
matched across the negative (M = 5.01, SD = 0.63) and neutral pictures sets (M = 4.86, SD = 0.73).
The selected pictures were re-sized to the dimensions of 11.7 cm × 8.8 cm from their original size of
26 cm × 19.5 cm to fit on the computer monitor. See Figure 1 for sample context picture stimuli.
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2.2.2. Words Used as Targets and Foils
Neutral words were selected from the Affective Norms for English Words database [37].
The ANEW consists of a set of English words with normative ratings for valence, arousal,
and dominance. All words selected from the database were concrete nouns, and neutral in valence.
Two unique 36-item word lists were created as the study lists. For Test 1, each of these lists was
intermixed among a different set of 36 foil words in separate subtests. A separate, unique set of 72 foils
was used as lure words on Test 2. Word lists were matched on normative valence and arousal ratings
across the negative (valence M = 5.7, SD = 1.24; arousal M = 4.71, SD = 0.87), and neutral (valence M = 5.42,
SD = 1.37; arousal M = 4.79, SD = 0.82) target lists, and the negative (valence M = 5.77, SD = 0.96,
arousal M = 4.52, SD = 0.87) and neutral (valence M = 5.6, SD = 0.86; arousal M = 4.36, SD = 0.86) foil lists.
2.3. Procedure
Participants completed the experiment individually using a desktop computer (19 inch monitor).
Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) [38]. Participants provided signed consent before providing
demographic information, including age, gender, years of education, and age that the participant had
learned English. Participants then completed the DASS (Psychology Foundation of Australia, Sydney,
Australia) [35] either as the first or final phase of the experiment to ensure the scales had no influence
on test responses. For this scale, each item was displayed on the computer monitor. Participants
were given a total of 5 s to respond to each statement with a keypress indicating their endorsement of
the statement.
The study consisted of a 2 × 2 × 2 design, with Encoding Context Valence (negative or neutral)
as a within-participant factor, and Encoding Instruction Group (shallow or deep) and Anxiety Group
(low or high) as between-participant factors.
2.3.1. Encoding Phase
Participants were presented with a set of 72 words (in 105 point white Sans font with a 0.14 cm
black border) overlayed onto individual IAPS pictures (26 cm by 19.5 cm) in sequential trials, and were
informed that their memory for the words would later be assessed. The 72 word-picture set was
divided into 2 separate sublists, one for words overlayed onto negative IAPS pictures and another
for words overlayed onto neutral IAPS pictures. Henceforth, these sublists will be referred to as
“negative study words” and “neutral study words”. The order in which the sublists were studied was
counterbalanced across participants. For each trial, participants were instructed to study each word
and to respond to two questions that appeared below the word-context pair, one at a time. For those
in the shallow encoding group the first question asked them to indicate whether the word displayed
on that trial contained the vowel “a”. For the deep encoding group, the first question asked them to
indicate whether the word displayed onscreen represented an object that was living or non-living.
Responses for each group were made by pressing the A or D key on a QWERTY keyboard. To avoid
the possibility that participants could evade or not attend to the picture that was used as a context,
participants in both encoding groups also answered a matching question; they indicated, subjectively,
whether the word represented an object similar to the contents of the picture (by pressing the 4 or 6 key
on the number pad of a QWERTY keyboard). Each question remained on the screen for 4 s, regardless
of when the participant responded, thus providing 8 s in total, per study trial. A fixation cross was
displayed between each trial for 250 ms.
2.3.2. Intentional Recognition Test 1
Following the Encoding Phase, participants completed an intentional recognition test for words
presented alone (i.e., without picture context), divided into two subtests. Each subtest contained
either the negative study words or neutral study words as targets, intermixed among a unique set
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of foil words. Thus, each subtest contained a total of 72 words (36 studied targets and 36 foils).
The subtest containing the negative study words will be referred to as “negative recognition test”;
and the subtest containing the neutral study words will be referred to as “neutral recognition test”.
On each recognition test trial, a word (in white Courier New font at 26 point) was shown in the centre
of the computer monitor. Participants were instructed to determine whether the word was “old” or
“new”, by pressing the J or L key on a QWERTY keyboard. Each word remained on the screen until
a response was provided, followed immediately by the subsequent target word. Prior to beginning
a subtest, participants were told whether the target words were derived from either the sublist of
negative study words or of neutral study words. The order in which each recognition subtest was
completed was counterbalanced across participants.
2.3.3. Incidental Recognition Test 2
A surprise recognition test was subsequently administered for the 36 foil words (same font and
size as at encoding) from the negative and the 36 from the neutral recognition tests. These 72 foil words
were intermixed among a brand new set of 72 foils, thus forming a recognition test totalling 144 words.
Participants were told to identify a word as “old” if they remembered seeing it in the previous phase,
or “new” (never seen in this experiment), by pressing the J or L key on a QWERTY keyboard.
3. Results
For Test 1, accuracy rates for target word memory were derived from the negative and neutral
study sublists. Accuracy was calculated as hit rate (total hits divided by 36) minus false alarm rate
(total false alarms divided by 36). For Test 2, accuracy rates were calculated as hit rate for foil words
derived from the negative or neutral Test 1 subtest (total hits for each separate recognition test divided
by 36) minus the overall false alarm rate on Test 2 (total false alarms divided by 72).
3.1. Test 1: Intentional Recognition of Studied Targets
We conducted a 2 (Recognition Test Valence: negative, neutral contexts) × 2 (Anxiety Groups: high,
low trait anxiety groups) × 2 (Encoding Instruction Group: deep, shallow encoding groups) repeated
measures ANOVA on accuracy rates for Test 1. Main effects were non-significant for Recognition Test
Valence, Anxiety Group, or Encoding Instruction Group. Two-way and 3-way interactions were also
non-significant. See Table 1 for mean hit, false alarm and accuracy rates.
Table 1. Test 1: Memory Performance for Participants with High versus Low Trait Anxiety in the Deep
and Shallow Encoding Conditions.
Low Anxiety Group High Anxiety Group
Deep Shallow Deep Shallow
Hit Rate
Negative 0.69 (0.21) 0.71 (0.15) 0.70 (0.18) 0.70 (0.13)
Neutral 0.73 (0.20) 0.68 (0.11) 0.68 (0.24) 0.70 (0.18)
False Alarm Rate
Negative 0.14 (0.18) 0.08 (0.07) 0.15 (0.24) 0.14 (0.21)
Neutral 0.10 (0.19) 0.06 (0.05) 0.19 (0.33) 0.12 (0.21)
Accuracy Rate
Negative 0.55 (0.34) 0.64 (0.16) 0.55 (0.40) 0.56 (0.28)
Neutral 0.63 (0.35) 0.62 (0.11) 0.50 (0.55) 0.59 (0.28)
3.2. Test 2: Incidental Memory for Foils
We conducted a 2 (Foil Valence: foils derived from the negative or neutral Test 1 blocks) × 2
(Anxiety Groups: high, low trait anxiety groups) × 2 (Encoding Instruction Group: deep, shallow
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encoding groups) repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy rate for Test 2 (see Table 2 for means).
All main effects were non-significant. All 2-way interactions were also non-significant. There was,
however, a significant 3-way interaction (F(1, 76) = 4.46, MSE < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.06, p < 0.04).
Table 2. Test 2: Memory for Foils and False Alarm Rate for Participants with High versus Low Trait
Anxiety in the Deep and Shallow Encoding Condition.
Low Anxiety Group High Anxiety Group
Deep Shallow Deep Shallow
Hit Rate
Negative 0.78 (0.17) 0.78 (0.18) 0.72 (0.19) 0.75 (0.25)
Neutral 0.76 (0.16) 0.81 (0.17) 0.72 (0.21) 0.71 (0.25)
False Alarm Rate
Negative 0.22 (0.20) 0.23 (0.10) 0.24 (0.21) 0.22 (0.18)
Neutral 0.10 (0.19) 0.06 (0.05) 0.19 (0.33) 0.12 (0.21)
Accuracy Rate
Negative 0.56 (0.21) 0.55 (0.14) 0.48 (0.29) 0.54 (0.26)
Neutral 0.54 (0.25) 0.59 (0.14) 0.48 (0.28) 0.50 (0.28)
For the high anxiety group, when words were studied using a shallow encoding instruction,
participants demonstrated a higher recognition accuracy for foils derived from the negative (M = 0.54,
SD = 0.26) recognition subtest, compared to the neutral (M = 0.50, SD = 0.28) subtest. The low anxiety
group showed the opposite pattern, with accuracy being higher for foils derived from the neutral
(M = 0.59, SD = 0.14) than negative (M = 0.55, SD = 0.14) subtest (see Figure 2).
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by memory for foils on Test 2. That is, we found a significant Foil Valence × Anxiety Group × Encoding
Instruction interaction: high trait anxiety participants who had studied words using a shallow encoding
instruction demonstrated a higher accuracy rate for the “negatively-tinged” than the “neutrally-tinged” foils.
Results support both of our hypotheses. In cases where words were encoded shallowly,
participants displayed higher recognition for target foil words initially encountered amongst target
words learned in a negative context, though this memory advantage was seen only in participants
with high trait anxiety. Findings from the study suggest that initial encoding context can indeed
create a downstream memory bias, extending the source-constrained retrieval hypothesis to emotional
contexts. Our results also suggest that negative encoding contexts produce a particularly salient bias
for individuals characterised by high levels of anxiety. That is, memory for otherwise neutral stimuli,
particularly among high anxiety individuals, may become grossly tainted by the mode of processing
engaged when such stimuli are incidentally encountered. In being tainted by a negative mode of
processing, or incidental stimuli (the foil words in our study), became more memorable.
Support for our interpretation comes from other studies showing that neutral stimuli
incidentally presented, or associated with, a negative or threatening context can become tainted [40].
Otherwise neutral stimuli can indeed become affiliated with the retrieved threat-related information.
As suggested by past related work, any memory enhancement that the individual harboured for the
original threat then transfers to the neutral stimuli, making these incidental stimuli more memorable as
well [26,34]. Notably, in our study, the downstream memory bias for “negatively-tinged” foils was only
demonstrated by participants with high trait anxiety. One possible explanation for this finding is that
the amount of attentional resources directed toward threat-relevant or threat-related stimuli differ in
those with high versus low anxiety. For high anxiety individuals, it has been shown that threat-relevant
stimuli recruit significant attentional [27–29] and working memory [41] resources. In being tainted by
the negative context, the otherwise neutral stimuli may now occupy more working memory space,
according for their enhanced memorability. In contrast to the high anxiety group, the low anxiety
individuals showed the exact opposite pattern of effects on Test 2, whereby neutrally-tainted foil
words were more salient than negatively-tainted foils. This pattern may have occurred because Test 2
consisted of intermixed trial types (both negative and neutral); another way to interpret our results
is that the salience of the neutral foils relative to the negative ones was enhanced for those with low
compared to high anxiety. That is, when memory for the set of foils was examined, the low anxiety
individuals preferentially accessed the neutral ones. In contrast, high anxiety individuals preferentially
searched for, or distributed their attention towards, sources of threat, accounting for their higher
memory for the negative over neutral foils.
Previous research has explored constrained memory search for words that were encoded with
various levels of processing [1,2,10]. In these studies, participants demonstrated a recognition bias for
foils derived from tests of words that had initially been processed deeply, as opposed to shallowly.
In our study, however, we manipulated the level of processing across groups, and failed to find
a main effect of depth of processing on Test 2 performance. In fact, there were no differences
between the groups until Anxiety Group and Foil Valence were taken into consideration. Unlike many
other studies exploring constrained memory search [2,12–15], our study implemented an emotional
context manipulation in conjunction with a depth of processing instruction at the time of encoding.
The discrepancy between the findings in our study and those of prior works suggests that the inclusion
of an emotional context at encoding altered the eventual downstream memory bias, reducing any
effect from depth of processing alone. One possible explanation is that there is a maximal amount of
benefit a target can receive from a particular encoding strategy. As a consequence of studying words
using a deep encoding instruction, the further benefit offered by negative emotional valence could
not be observed (i.e., memory performance was already high). In contrast to the deep instruction,
a shallow mode of processing offers relatively less benefit to memory. Here the negative contexts had
more leeway to provide an observable benefit.
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Another possible explanation is that processing words using a deep rather than shallow encoding
instruction diverts attention away from the emotional context. A deep encoding instruction asks the
participant to purposely think of the meaning of that target word, and focuses attention and cognitive
thought on other items/words associated with the word’s meaning. Conversely, words encoded using
a shallow instruction are less likely to link to semantic associations as the focus of attention is instead
on decoding the physical features of the lettering used to spell it (i.e., whether there is the vowel “a” in
the word). This may allow more availability of resources to be devoted to processing the valence of
the underlying visual image. Importantly it was only those with high, and not low, anxiety who were
sensitive to the biasing effect of the negatively valenced image.
One aspect of our data which requires further explanation, however, is the absence of the expected
memory advantage for negative target words on Test 1. The lack of effect may have occurred because
our chosen visual negative contexts produced inconsistent affective responses across participants.
That is, in our study, the images used as negative contexts consisted of a wide variety of content
(e.g., blood, cemeteries, automobile accidents). As suggested by Radomsky and Rachman [42],
a memory advantage for emotional material might only be evident with stimuli that are particularly
threatening to that individual. Due to the variety of negative images used in our study, a given
participant might have considered one picture threatening, stimulating a high affective response,
whereas another participant might not have perceived the same image as a threat. For example,
one participant may be upset by the sight of blood shown in some of the pictures, whereas others
may not. We should not expect a memory advantage for a word accompanied by a non-threatening
picture, since the taint of a non-threatening picture would effectively be similar to that from a neutral
picture. Future studies could examine a possible downstream memory effect when the visual context at
study is more consistently related to a specific threat, in subgroups of anxious participants (e.g., spider
pictures in spider-phobics).
Why then was there a downstream effect on memory for the foils? Guez and Naveh-Benjamin [43]
suggest that the influence of a particular manipulation on memory (in their case divided attention,
and here, emotional context) may become more pronounced over longer time frames, as consolidation
of the memory takes place. Given the relatively short amount of elapsed time between study and
Test 1 in our paradigm, the benefit conferred to targets overlayed onto negative versus neutral contexts
may not have yet emerged. That is, memory for the neutral-context targets was high, though if we
had delayed Test 1, it is possible that differential forgetting may have occurred, allowing us to see the
expected memorial benefit for targets encoded within a negative context. Given our paradigm, it is
therefore even more remarkable that we observed the memory for foils effect on Test 2, for the foils
initially encountered during the negative Test 1 subtest. Clearly our manipulation of context produced
some difference in how the “negative-context” versus “neutral-context” targets were subsequently
evaluated, and this differential evaluation was inadvertently applied to the foils contained on each
test, resulting in the differential memory for foils. Alternatively, participants may not have encoded
as deeply or with as salient of an emotional tag during our encoding phase due to the pictures being
presented in the background. However, the categorical membership of all the words in Test 1 as
negative or neutral was likely reinforced through our instructions for Test 1, in which we informed
the participant they would perform a recognition test for either the words overlayed onto negative or
neutral pictures. When completing Test 1, informing participants of the origin of the set of words in
each subtest may have brought the images back to mind, contributing to the subsequent emotionality
boost we observed on Test 2 for the foils.
5. Conclusions
Results support our hypothesis that initial encoding context (whether negative or neutral) can
influence later memory for incidental stimuli (the foils). In the framework of our research question,
emotional events from the past can taint our perception of the present, making current circumstances
more memorable. When we constrain our memory search to information or events encountered within
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a negative context, or learnt using a negative mode of processing, some memory benefit held by
those thoughts may be conferred unto incidental stimuli within our current environment. Of note,
this downstream memory bias was significant only in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety.
Our findings suggest that anxiety can engender a mode of cognitive processing that taints or colours
otherwise neutral information.
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